The First of Two from NRO The Corner

This is the first of two posts from NRO The Corner (and by David Freddoso) that made such good points and weren't really linkable that I decided to post them entirely.

Dems Attack Minority Rights by David Freddoso

During the 19th Century, the motion to recommit was used mostly by the majority to correct small errors in a bill. But in 1909 Rep. John Fitzgerald led a rebellion against House Speaker Joe Cannon (R.) to establish it in the House rules as a tool for the minority. The CRS report quotes Fitzgerald stating that the motion's purpose is to give "the minority the rightto have a vote upon its position upon great public questions."

The most obvious impact of the rules change is that these motions will no longer offer the House minority party a chance to force a vote on tax increases. This is because, under the new rules, motions to recommit must comply with budget and pay-go rules in the context of the larger bill. Minority Republicans will no longer be able to use motions to recommit in order to strip tax increases out of larger bills. As Minority Whip Eric Cantor (R., Va.) told me last week, "What they are doing is cutting off the ability of the minority, the Republicans, to prevent a tax hike. If there is a tax hike right now, we have a right to demand an up-or-down vote on it, and the public will know. With the rules change, this will no longer be the case. At best, we can only offer another tax increase in its place."

To put it another way, the change allows Democrats to vote for tax increases without having to put themselves clearly on the record for higher taxes. In the last Congress, minority Republicans forced four such votes, putting Democrats squarely on the record for tax increases that were contained in two energy bills, the farm bill, and a bill related to bailing out holders of troubled mortgages. In all four cases, the Democrats won, but at least their priorities were recorded for the record.

And that is the real problem. The CRS report describes the dilemma for members of the majority who face such motions, by stating that they "have the effect of creating a diffcult political choice for Members who support both the underlying measure and the amendment contained in the motion to recommit." It goes on:

If such proponents of the measure vote for the motion to recommit with "non-forthwith" instructions, they are voting to send the measure back to committee, delaying or potentially killing the bill and perhaps breaking with their own party. However, if such Members vote against the motion to recommitthey may be on public record as having voted against a policy that they (and perhaps their constituents) strongly support.

The report then notes that such a vote could later become the subject of a political ad. With the new rules change, Democrats are protecting themselves from the kind of accountability that Republicans faced when they were in the majority, and which majority Democrats also faced prior to their loss of Congressional control in 1994.

"The new rules basically shield them from taking embarrassing votes," said Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wisc.), ranking member of the House Budget Committee. "It denies us the ability to have clean votes based on our policy alternatives." Note how Ryan's language echoes that used by Fitzgerald 100 years ago.

The CRS report references several occasions in which Republicans, while holding the majority, complained about motions to recommit. As recently as 2003, Rep. John Boehner (R-Ohio) complained on the House floor that Democrats were using such a motion to put the squeeze on Republicans — forcing them to take a tough vote or else kill their own bill. The motion, he said, "refers the bill back to committee and we are promptly to deal with it. For those of you who are not that familiar with the nuance, the effect of this motion is to kill the bill."

Still, as much as Republicans disliked Democrats' use of the House rules against them, they never tried to take away the minority's right to do this. Democrats are now cracking down.

Given the opacity of such obscure procedural issues for the average voter, Democrats have every reason to believe they can limit the rights of their legislative adversaries without any political consequences. But they may regret such changes some day, when they next lose control.